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States Escape Liability for Copyright Infringement?

I.

INTRODUCTION

The United States Supreme Court has yet to review the interaction
between the eleventh amendment and copyright legislation. Furthermore, until recently, the controversy over whether a copyright proprietor could sue a state, its instrumentality, or agency for copyright
infringement had led to split decisions in the federal district and circuit courts.
The copyright and patent clause of the United States Constitution'
grants Congress the enumerated power to promote the creativity of
authors and inventors by protecting and rewarding their creativity.
Pursuant to this power, Congress has enacted legislation, which today
is embodied in the Copyright Act of 1976 (the 1976 Act). 2 This legis3
lation grants copyright proprietors exclusive rights in their works
4
and provides them a cause of action against "anyone" who infringes
their copyright.
Section 3015 of the 1976 Act provides that all rights concerning
copyright must be adjudicated thereunder. Any rights that existed
under the common law or statutes of any state equivalent to those
governed by the 1976 Act are therefore preempted.6 To create uniformity in copyright law, Congress enacted section 1338(a) of Title 28
of the United States Code,7 which grants federal courts exclusive
subject matter jurisdiction over any action arising under the 1976
Act. Federal courts are, therefore, the sole forum in which a copyright proprietor may bring a cause of action for copyright
infringement.
1. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
2. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-914 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986) (successor to Copyright Act of
1909, Pub. L. No. 60-349, ch. 320, 35 Stat. 1075 (1909)).
3. See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1982).
4. 17 U.S.C. § 501(a) (1982) (defining copyright infringer as "[a]nyone who violates any of the exclusive rights of the copyright owner"; contrast the 1909 Act, which
defines a copyright infringer as "any person" violating the exclusive rights of the copyright owner).
5. 17 U.S.C. § 301 (1982). In the 1976 Act, "Congress attempted 'to foreclose any
conceivable misinterpretation of its unqualified intention ... and to avoid the development of any vague borderline areas between State and Federal [copyright] protection.'" N. BOORSTYN, COPYRIGHT LAw 12 (1981) (citation omitted).
6. See 17 U.S.C. § 301(a) (1982).
7. 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (1982).

The eleventh amendment,8 however, denies suit against any state
by citizens of another state or a foreign state. The Supreme Court
has interpreted this amendment broadly, thus barring suits by citizens against their own state.9 As these legal principles interact, a
copyright proprietor has been not only granted an exclusive right,
but has also been denied any remedy against a state infringing upon
the copyright. To date, all federal district and circuit courts previously holding the eleventh amendment subordinate to the 1976 Act
have since ruled against such abrogation.lO There no longer exists a
split in the federal courts: states are immune from suit for copyright
infringement.
This judicial interpretation is significant. States, their institutions,
and agencies-such as public schools and universities, hospitals, law
enforcement and correctional facilities, and other entities owned or
operated by states--are major users of copyrighted material. Thus,
the adverse impact of allowing state misappropriation and/or unlicensed reproduction of textbooks, sound recordings, photographs,
literature, videos, motion pictures, computer software, and sheet music, to name a few, is overwhelming. State sovereign immunity from
copyright infringement liability has significant adverse effects upon
the system of copyright: copyright proprietors are without protection
from state infringement; copyright proprietors have diminished economic incentives for continued creative productivity; and finally, the
availability of copyrighted works may decrease as a result.
Parts II and III of this comment trace the development, purpose,
and scope of the eleventh amendment and copyright law, respectively. Part IV analyzes the impact of judicial interpretation of the
eleventh amendment on the copyright system. Finally, Part V proposes solutions to what has become a severe injustice in a system initially developed not only to protect copyright proprietors, but also to
encourage creativity for 0-e general public benefit.
8. U.S. CONST. amend. XI. "The Judicial power of the United States shall not be
construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one
of the United States by Citizens of another State or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State." Id.
9. Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890); see infra notes 16-18 and accompanying
text.
10. BV Eng'g v. University of California, 858 F.2d 1394 (9th Cir. 1988), cert. denied,
57 U.S.L.W. 3621 (1989) (overruling Mills Music, Inc. v. Arizona, 591 F.2d 1278 (9th Cir.
1979)). Mills held that states may be subjected to suit for copyright infringement.
Under BV Engineering,states are immune from suit for copyright infringement. Furthermore, the United States District Court for the Western District of Virginia subjected states to copyright infringement suits in Johnson v. University of Virginia, 606
F. Supp. 321 (W.D. Va. 1985). One year later, the same court reached the opposite result in Richard Anderson Photography v. Radford University, 633 F. Supp. 1154 (W.D.
Va. 1986), aff'd in part, rev'd in part sub nom., Richard Anderson Photography v.
Brown, 852 F.2d 114 (4th Cir. 1988); see infra notes 93-148 and accompanying text.
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II.

DEVELOPMENT OF THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT

In 1793, the Supreme Court, in Chisholm v. Georgia,11 held that a
state was amenable to suit in federal court by citizens of another
state. The Court asserted original jurisdiction over the suit, deciding
the jurisdictional issue under article III, section 2 of the Constitution. 12 This article extends federal judicial power to suits between
states and citizens of another state.'

3

In response to this ruling, con-

siderable national concern arose over the vulnerability of state trea-

suries to eager plaintiffs. 14 The adoption of the eleventh amendment
soon followed, and remains unchanged.15
A.

The Scope of the Eleventh Amendment

1.

Early Case Law Development

The eleventh amendment itself bars suit in law and equity against
a state only by a citizen of another state or by foreigners.

The

Supreme Court has broadly interpreted this doctrine of sovereign immunity by carving out extensions and limitations. In Hans v. Louisiana,1 6 the Court held that immunity extends to actions in federal
court by citizens suing their own state. 1 7 The decision was based on
the fact that the eleventh amendment did not contain a clear state8
ment preventing a citizen's suit.'
In Ex Parte Young,19 the Court created an exception to the elev11. 2 U.s. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793) (where two South Carolina citizens sued in diversity
the State of Georgia to enforce a debt owed to a deceased South Carolina resident).
12. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. "The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in
Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States ....
to
Controversies between two or more States;-between a State and Citizens of another
State; [and] between Citizens of different States." Id.
13. Chisholm, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 420.
14. See Cullison, Interpretationof the Eleventh Amendment, 5 Hous. L. REV. 1, 1014 (1967); see also Nowak, The Scope of CongressionalPower to Create Causes of Action
Against State Governments and the History of the Eleventh and Fourteenth Amendments, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 1413 (1975) (general discussion of eleventh amendment).
15. U.S. CONST. amend. XI (ratified February 7, 1795). The amendment provides:
"The judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in
law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of
another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State." Id.
16. 134 U.S. 1 (1890) (suit against state by Louisiana citizen to recover damages for
interest coupons annexed to bonds of the state).
17. Id.
18. Id. at 15.
19. 209 U.S. 123 (1908) (eleventh amendment's partial recognition of state sovereign immunity does not bar federal injunction restraining state official from enforcing
state law in violation of the Constitution).

enth amendment's jurisdictional bar. The Court held that the
amendment did not bar a federal court action seeking to enjoin a
state official from enforcing a statute which violated the fourteenth
amendment. 20 The state official was not viewed as representing the
state during such a violation, and therefore was susceptible to suit as
an individual. 2 1 However, the non-consenting state remained im22
mune from suit.

In Petty v. Tennessee-Missouri Bridge Commission,2 3 the Court
ruled that federal law alone should govern sovereign immunity questions. 24 This decision left the state legislature with no power to abrogate the eleventh amendment. In so deciding, the Court recognized
Congress's power to place a condition upon states that wished to participate in federally-regulated activities. This condition constituted a
25
waiver of eleventh amendment immunity.
2.

The Parden-Employees-Edelman Trilogy

Parden v. Terminal Railway Co.26 was brought by an individual
"upon a cause of action expressly created by Congress." 27 For the
first time, the Supreme Court was faced with the question of
whether, through the enactment of a federal statute (the Federal
Employee Liability Act (FELA)), Congress intended to subject a
state to suit in federal court,28 and if so, whether Congress had con29
stitutional power to unilaterally abrogate the eleventh amendment,
30
thus removing the state consent-to-suit requirement.
20. Id. at 159-60.
21. Id. The relief granted in Ex Parte Young was not monetary, but prospective in
nature: an injunction to conform future behavior of the state official in accordance
with the fourteenth amendment. See id at 164-65.
22. Id. at 159-60.
23. 359 U.S. 275 (1959) (suit to recover under Jones Act (46 U.S.C. § 688 (1982)) for
death of husband caused by defendant state agency). The federally-regulated state activity in Petty was the state's participation in a congressionally-approved interstate
compact that contained a sue-and-be-sued clause. Id at 278-79.
24. Id. at 279-80.
25. Id at 280.
26. 377 U.S. 184 (1964). Parden involved an action brought for damages under the
Federal Employers Liability Act [hereinafter FELA] by employees of a state-owned interstate railroad for personal injuries sustained while employed by the railroad. FELA
states:
Every common carrier by railroad while engaging in commerce between any
of the several States . . .shall be liable in damages to any person suffering
injury while he is employed by such carrier in such commerce ... [and that]
[u]nder this chapter an action may be brought in a district court of the United
States.
45 U.S.C. §§ 51-56 (1982).
27. Parden, 377 U.S. at 187.
28. Id. See supra note 26 for pertinent text of the FELA statute.
29. Id.
30. Abrogation of the eleventh amendment negates the need for the consent-tosuit requirement.
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The Court concluded that the legislative intent and the language of
FELA revealed Congress's desire to include states in the class of possible defendants under a FELA cause of action. 31 Due to the "broad
and all-embracing" 32 use of "every common carrier" in its definition
of possible defendants, 33 the Court recognized that application of sovereign immunity would result in granting a plaintiff a right without a
remedy. The Court was "unwilling to conclude that Congress intended so pointless and frustrating a result."34 Thus, if sufficient
congressional intent is found through both legislative history and
statutory language, a court should recognize congressional power to
subject non-consenting states to suit-regardless of eleventh amendment immunity.
Further, each state has surrendered a portion of its sovereign immunity through ratification of the Constitution, thereby granting
Congress the power to regulate interstate commerce. 35 In Parden,
the state-owned railroad, which engaged in interstate commerce after
enactment of FELA, had entered into activities subject to congressional regulation; thus, the state impliedly subjected itself to suit in
federal court. Parden made states amenable to suit in federal court
whenever they undertook an activity for which a private person
could be held liable under federal law.
In Employees of Departmentof Public Health & Welfare v. Department of Public Health & Welfare,36 the Court affirmed Parden.
Power exists to subject non-consenting states to suit in federal court
when Congress so intends.3 7 The Court focused on the Fair Labor
Standards Act's (FLSA) use of the language "any employer," together with its mandate that suit could only be brought in competent
31. Parden, 377 U.S. at 189-90.
32. Id. at 189.
33. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
34. Parden, 377 U.S. at 190 (emphasis added).
35. Such power is derived from the commerce clause of the Constitution: "Congress shall have Power to... regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the
several States, and with Indian Tribes." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
36. 411 U.S. 279 (1973). The employees of state health facilities sought overtime
pay under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), which extended statutory coverage
to state employees. See 29 U.S.C. § 216 (1982). The district court dismissed the action
because the state had not given its consent; the action was therefore barred by the
eleventh amendment. Employees of Dept. of Pub. Health & Welfare v. Department of
Pub. Health & Welfare, 452 F.2d 820, 822 (1971), aff'd, 411 U.S. 279 (1973) (legislative
history of FLSA reveals no congressional intent to deprive a state of its sovereign
immunity).
37. Employees, 411 U.S. at 286-87.

jurisdictions.3 8 Although finding that "any employer" includes states

and their agencies, the Court held that the absence of congressional
intent to subject states to suit was sufficient to prevent state liabil-

ity.3 9 Furthermore, although FLSA allows federal court actions, the

eleventh amendment renders federal courts incompetent to hear
suits by employees against a state.40
Employees was justified by the Court's distinction of Parden in
three significant ways: (1) FLSA suits could be brought in state
courts; FELA suits could not; (2) FLSA imposes a financially
overburdensome scheme of regulation on states; Parden involved an
isolated activity with no such burden; and (3) the Court did not find
congressional intent to subject states to suit under FLSA, whereas
such intent was present under FELA.41
In Edelman v. Jordan,42 the Court addressed the issue of whether
state operation of a federally-assisted program was a clear indication
of its consent to suit in federal court. 43 The Court found it was not. 44
Further, the Court determined that the Aid to Aged, Blind, and Disabled statute45 created no cause of action against states by beneficiaries. 46 Congressional intent to subject states to suit-thereby
abrogating the eleventh amendment-was determined "wholly
absent."47
Through Edelman, the Court refined its interpretation of the eleventh amendment. An express cause of action is not stated within a
statute absent congressional intent to subject states to suit and absent
implied state waiver.48 Moreover, state participation in a federallyassisted program does not imply state consent to suit. 49 To allow
amenability to suit under Employees and Edelman, intent must be
specifically addressed within the applicable federal law.
38. Id at 284.
39. Id. at 284-85.
40. Id at 287.
41. Id. at 284-86. The Court also justified its holding by distinguishing Parden on
the basis that the state did not waive immunity by operating a non-profit health
center.
42. 415 U.S. 651 (1974) (class action against state officials administering federalstate programs of Aid to the Aged, Blind and Disabled).
43. Id. at 671-74.
44. Id at 673-74.
45. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 801-805 (1970 & Supp. II 1978) (repealed 1975).
46. Edelman, 415 U.S. at 674-77.
47. Id. at 672.
48. Id. at 671. The Court specifically disapproved the holding in Shapiro v.
Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969). Also disapproved were three district court decisions
which had been summarily affirmed by the Supreme Court. See Edelman, 415 U.S. at
670 n.13. The Supreme Court, relying on Ex Parte Young, pointed out that although
the eleventh amendment prohibits retroactive monetary relief, it allows an award of
prospective injunctive relief to bar any future unconstitutional conduct. Id. at 677.
49. See supra notes 43-44 and accompanying text.
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3.

The Beginnings of Congressional Abrogation of the Eleventh
Amendment

The Court discarded the requirement of state waiver or consent to
thus giving Congress the unilateral

suit in Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer,5 0

power to abrogate the eleventh amendment. By treating the Equal
Opportunity Act of 197251 as an exercise of congressional authority
under section 5 of the fourteenth amendment,5

2

the Court found

clear evidence of intent to abrogate the eleventh amendment.53 The
Court concluded that Congress has sufficient plenary power to abrogate the eleventh amendment.54 The enabling clause of the fourteenth amendment55 permits Congress to pass "appropriate
legislation" necessary to enforce equal protection and due process
57
56
Fitzpatrick was expanded in Hutto v. Finney,
against the states.
where the Court found clear evidence of the inclusion of states in the

defendant class by looking solely at congressional intent,58 rather
50. 427 U.s. 445 (1976). Fitzpatrick brought an action against the State of Connecticut to have a state retirement plan declared unconstitutional based on sex discrimination. He relied on certain 1972 amendments to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964, in which Congress had authorized the federal courts to award monetary damages against states for sex discrimination to private individuals. Id. at 448-49; see 42
U.S.C. §§ 2000e(a)-2(a) (1982). The court of appeals held that Edelman controlled and
money damages could not be awarded. Fitzpatrick, 427 U.S. at 450-51. The Supreme
Court reversed.
51. Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103 (1972) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1982)).
52. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5. "The Congress shall have the power to enforce,
by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article." Id.
53. Fitzpatrick,427 U.S. at 452.
54. Id. at 456. Treating the 1972 Equal Opportunity Act as an exercise of congressional authority under section 5 of the fourteenth amendment, the Supreme Court
held Congress could require the state to provide back pay to victims of state discrimination. Id.; see also Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332 (1979). Quern, a sequel to Edelman,
involved the issue of whether the federal court could order a state to send an explanatory notice to advise members of the plaintiff class about state administrative procedures available which determined entitlement to past welfare benefits. Id. at 334.
55. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5.
56. Fitzpatrick,427 U.S. at 456.
57. 437 U.S. 678 (1978) (prison inmates' suit against state officials demanding correction of unconstitutional conditions in Arkansas prison system). Hutto involved the
Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976 (Pub. L. No. 94-559, 90 Stat. 2641
(1976) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1982)), which grants payment of attorney's fees in
"any" action to enforce particular civil rights laws. Id. at 694. The Supreme Court,
relying upon the congressional intent of the statute in question, allowed the prison inmates to recover attorney's fees, even though the statute did not expressly include
states as possible defendants. Id. at 699-700.
58. Hutto, 437 U.S. at 693-98. The holding in Hutto, however, may be limited to its
specific facts because of Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234 (1985) (statutory language must evidence unmistaken intent to support a finding of abrogation of
the eleventh amendment). Justice Powell partially dissented in Hutto claiming that

than relying on statutory language.

4.

The Supreme Court's Most Recent Interpretation of
Congressional Abrogation of the Eleventh Amendment

Abrogation resulting from a federally-created cause of action was
9
not addressed again until Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon.5
60
The statute at issue was the Rehabilitation Act, which grants remedies to any individual harmed by an act or omission by "any recipient
of Federal assistance." 6 ' The Court developed a stringent test to de62
termine state waiver of immunity from federal court jurisdiction.
A federally-created cause of action, as developed within a statute,
"must specify the State's intention to subject itself to suit in federal
court."63 The Court asserted:
In the absence of an unequivocal waiver specifically applicable to federalcourt jurisdiction, we decline to find that California has waived its constitutional immunity.... Congress may abrogate the States' constitutionally secured immunity from suit in federal court only
by making its intention
64
unmistakably clear in the language of the statute.

Clarifying its position on eleventh amendment immunity, the Court
determined that recovery from a state was barred absent definitive
statutory language, despite the Rehabilitation Act's remedial
65
provisions.
the statutory language was not specific enough to override eleventh amendment immunity and that the awarding of attorney's fees would impose too substantial a burden
upon the state treasury. Hutto, 437 U.S. at 704, 708 (Powell, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). Justice Powell also wrote the majority opinions in both Atascadero
and Welch v. Texas Department of Highways & Public Transportation, 107 S.Ct. 2941
(1987) (suit under Jones Act not allowed unless state expressly waives immunity).
Hutto, Atascadero, and Welch are significant in terms of analysis because other cases
in this time frame did not involve federally-created causes of action. See Pennhurst
State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1 (1981) (Developmentally Disabled
Assistance and Bill of Rights Act, as a federal-state funding statute, does not create
rights to abrogate the eleventh amendment); see also Pennhurst State School & Hosp.
v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89 (1984) (eleventh amendment barred pendent state law

claim).
59. 473 U.S. 234 (1985) (handicapped plaintiff alleged employment discrimination
under Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (29 U.S.C. § 794 (1982)) when a California state hospital denied him employment).
60. Rehabilitation Act of 1973, § 504, 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1978) (previously amended
version).
61. Id The Rehabilitation Act, as amended, uses the language "[n]o otherwise
qualified handicapped individual." Id.
62. Atascadero, 473 U.S. at 241.
63. Id (emphasis in original). CAL. CONST. *art. III, § 5. Section 5, upon which
plaintiff Atascadero relied, did not specifically indicate a state's willingness to be sued
in federal court and provided that suits may be brought against the state in such a
manner and in such courts as shall be directed by law. This was insufficient to constitute a waiver of California's eleventh amendment sovereign immunity.
64. Atascadero, 473 U.S. at 241-42 (emphasis added).
65. See id at 246. The Court appears to reject its holding in Parden v. Terminal
Railway Co., 377 U.S. 184 (1964), however it does not explicitly do so; see supra notes
26-35 and accompanying text.
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Consequently, Atascadero limited Fitzpatrick66 in two ways. First,
the Court held that Congress's power to unilaterally abrogate the
eleventh amendment, absent state consent, was limited to laws
passed pursuant to section 5 of the fourteenth amendment.6 7 Second,

Congress could not limit eleventh amendment protection by, generally authorizing a federal cause of action; 68 specific inclusion of states
6 9
as defendants was required.
The Court's most recent ruling on implied waiver is

found in

Welch v. Texas Department of Highways & Public Transportation.70
Welch involved an action brought under the Jones Act,71 which provides that "any seaman" injured during the scope of employment
may sue for damages in federal district court. 7 2 The Court held that
3
Congress had not expressed in "unmistakable statutory language"7
any intent to abrogate the eleventh amendment; "any seaman . . . 'is
not the kind of unequivocal statutory language sufficient to abrogate
the Eleventh Amendment.' "74 Congress can create an exception to

the eleventh amendment only through an unmistakably clear intent
75
evidenced in the statutory language.
Welch reveals that the Court has reserved judgment on whether
Congress may abrogate the eleventh amendment pursuant to its arti-

cle I power: "assum[ing], without deciding or intimating a view of the

question, that the authority of Congress to subject non-consenting
States to suit in federal court is not confined to section 5 of the Four-

teenth Amendment."7 6 Notably, the Court has never permitted
66. Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976); see supra notes 50-65 and accompanying text.
67. Atascadero, 473 U.S. at 238 (citing Fitzpatrick, 427 U.S. at 456).
68. See supra notes 59-65 and accompanying text.
69. Id
70. 107 S. Ct. 2941 (1987). Plaintiff, an employee of the Texas Highways Department, filed suit against the department and the state under section 33 of the Jones Act
(46 U.S.C. § 688 (1978) (amended 1982)) after being injured while working on a ferry
dock operated by the department.
71. 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1978) (amended 1982).
72. Id
73. Welch, 107 S. Ct. at 2947 (relying on Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473
U.S. 234, 246 (1985)).
74. Id, (quoting Atascadero, 473 U.S. at 246) (italics omitted); see Comment, More
Plenary Than Thou: A Post-Welch Compromise Theory of CongressionalPower to Abrogate Sovereign Immunity, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1022 (1988).
75. Welch, 107 S. Ct. at 2946. To the extent that Parden is inconsistent with the
Supreme Court's holdings in Atascadero and Welch, it is overruled. Thus, the Parden
discussion of congressional intent as sufficient to abrogate the eleventh amendment is
no longer good law. Welch, 107 S. Ct. at 2948.
76. Welch, 107 S. Ct. at 2946.

states to raise the eleventh amendment as a bar to suit when federal
jurisdiction is exclusive. 77 Such is the case with the 1976 Act.
III.
A.

DEVELOPMENT, PURPOSE, AND SCOPE OF COPYRIGHT LAW

Origins and Development of CopyrightLaw

The copyright and patent clause grants Congress the power "to
promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive right to their respective Writings and Discoveries." 78 The clause encourages a free
flow of ideas and promotes creativity by granting a monopoly, limited
in time, excluding others from using works without authority. 79 Pursuant to this clause, Congress has the power to enact any legislation
consistent with the intent of the Constitution. Further, state ratification of the copyright and patent clause constitutes the relinquishment of each state's sovereign power over copyrights and patents
whenever Congress exercises its power concurrently. Consequently,
strict limitations or actual abrogation of eleventh amendment immunity seems inherent in the clause.
Pursuant to this grant of power, Congress enacted the first federal
patent and copyright legislation in 1790,80 in order to develop a national system of enforcement for the right created in authors and inventors. Since 1790, Congress has "fixed the conditions upon which
patents and copyrights shall be granted,"8' revising the legislation
four times-1831, 82 1870,83 1909,84 and 1976.85 These revisions were
made to protect new forms or expression from exploitation as they
77. In Parden v. Terminal Railway Co., 377 U.S. 184 (1964), the Court's decision to
abrogate the eleventh amendment was influenced significantly by the lack of a state
remedy. See id. at 190. In Employees of Department of Public Health & Welfare v.
Department of Public Health & Welfare, 411 U.S. 279 (1973), the Court emphasized the
availability of a state remedy, in contrast to Parden, when it upheld sovereign immunity. See id. at 285-86. There was also a state remedy available in Welch, 107 S. Ct.
2941 (1987), Atascadero, 473 U.S. 234 (1985), and Edelman, 415 U.S. 651 (1974). The
Copyright Act of 1976 does not allow for a state remedy. See 17 U.S.C. § 301 (1982); see
also 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (1982).
78. U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 8. The copyright and patent clause was founded in
the English system, specifically in the Statute of Anne (8 Anne ch. 19 (1710)), which
provided authors with a 14 year exclusive right to print their new works and with a
renewal right spanning an additional 14 years. This shifted the emphasis within English copyright law from serving the interests of publishers to serving the interest of
the producer of the creative work. See Comment, The Applicability of Eleventh
Amendment Immunity Under the Copyright Acts of 1909 and 1976, 36 AM. U.L. REV
163, 173-74 (1986).
79. Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enter., 471 U.S. 539, 546 (1985).
80. Act of Apr. 10, 1790, ch. 15, 1 Stat. 109 (1790).
81. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 229 (1964).
82. Act of Feb. 3, 1831, ch. 16, 4 Stat. 436 (1831).
83. Act of July 8, 1870, ch. 230, 16 Stat. 198 (1870).
84. Copyright Act of 1909, Pub. L. No. 60-349, ch. 320, 35 Stat. 1075 (1909).
85. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-914 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
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86
became commercially significant.

B.

The Copyright Act of 1976

Section 501 of the 1976 Act establishes a right of action for copyright infringement:
(a) Anyone who violates any of the exclusive rights of the copyright owner as
provided by sections 106 through 118, or who imports copies or phonorecords
into the United States in violation of section 602, is an infringer of the copyright. (b) The legal or beneficial owner of an exclusive right under a copyright is entitled, subject to the requirements of sections 205 (d) and 411, to,
institute an action for any infringement
of that particular right committed
87
while he or she is the owner of it.

Owners of copyrighted material may, consequently, bring a federallycreated cause of action against an infringer of their copyright. An infringer is defined as "anyone" who violates the owner's exclusive
rights.88 Unfortunately, the legislative history of the 1976 Act does
not define the term "anyone," nor does it define the class of possible
defendants subject to suit for copyright infringement.8 9 The resulting question is whether states are considered possible defendants, and
therefore included within the term "anyone."
A copyright owner may vindicate violations of his property rights.
Pursuant to section 301 of the 1976 Act and section 1338(a) of Title 28
of the United States Code, a copyright infringement suit can only be
brought in federal court; state courts are not available forums. 90 As
the following discussion demonstrates, this jurisdictional limitation,
when coupled with the eleventh amendment, completely destroys a
copyright owner's right to sue for copyright infringement. Such a result is inconsistent with the federally-created property right in copyrighted material. Indeed, it denies exercise of that property right,
leaving proprietors with no remedy for infringement. Authors are
86. As new forms of expression became commercially important, and with the advance of technology, the copyright law was revised. In addition, the 1976 revision altered the time at which a work could give rise to a copyright. Initially, copyright
protection attached upon the publication of the work. The 1976 revision. made the
event no longer publication, but instead, fixation of the work in a tangible form of expression. The 1976 revision allowed Congress to exercise more fully its power under
the copyright and patent clause.
87. 17 U.S.C. §§ 501(a), (b) (1982) (emphasis added).
88. However, the 1909 Act reads: "If any person shall infringe the copyright in
any work protected under the copyright laws of the United States such person shall be
liable." Pub. L. No. 60-349, ch. 320, 35 Stat. 1075, 1081 (1909) (superseded by 17 U.S.C.
§ 501(a) (1982)) (emphasis added).
89. The legislative history of the 1909 Act also fails to clarify the definition of "any
person." See, e.g., 43 CONG. REc. 3701-05, 3744-47, 3761-69, 3831-32 (1909).
90. See supra notes 5-7 and accompanying text.

consequently denied compensation and encouragement to produce
additional creative works, consistent with the original intent of the
1976 Act. Moreover, states are, in essence, encouraged to infringe, as
they are free from liability for acts of infringement.
Copyright Law and the Eleventh Amendment: Federal Court

C

Interpretation
1.

Copyright Law Pre-Atascadero/-Welch

Despite the finding in Wihtol v. Crow91 that the defendant had infringed copyrighted material, the Eighth Circuit barred the plaintiff
from suing a state instrumentality for damages payable from state
funds. 92 Seventeen years later, the Ninth Circuit, in Mills Music,
Inc. v. Arizona,93 refused to follow Wihtol. The Ninth Circuit held
that the eleventh amendment does not bar suits against states infringing copyrights. 94 Thus, a music publisher prevailed against a
state for infringement of a copyrighted musical composition. 95 The
court found the state was immune from suit absent waiver or consent
to federal jurisdiction. 96 Relying on the "Parden-Employees-Edelman
trilogy," 97 the court concluded that waiver occurs when: (a) Congress
has created a cause of action against a class of defendants which includes states; and (b) the state enters into the federally-regulated
activity.9 8
The Mills court concluded that Congress authorized suit against a
broad class by its use of the words "any person" 99 in defining a copyright infringer. The court determined that the language "any person" was "sweeping and without apparent limitation," thus
suggesting Congress's intent to include states as defendants.100 The
91. 309 F.2d 777 (8th Cir. 1962). Without authorization, Crow, head of the vocal
department at an Iowa junior college, copied Wihtol's copyrighted song, rearranged it,
and printed it, making no reference to its copyright owner. Id. at 778-79.
92. Id. at 781-82. Defendants were a state school district and state agent constituting part of a state educational system which performed a "state governmental function
under state law and at state expense." Id, at 782.
93. 591 F.2d 1278 (9th Cir. 1979). Mills Music sued the State of Arizona for infringement of a musical composition by the coliseum board, an agency of the State of
Arizona, to promote a state fair. Id. at 1280.
94. Id at 1286. Mills was decided under the 1909 Act. See id at 1278 n.1.
95. Id. at 1280, 1286-87.
96. I at 1282.
97. Id. at 1283; see supra notes 26-49 and accompanying text.
98. Id. at 1283. It is important to realize that Mills is pre-Atascadero; therefore,
the language "any person" within the 1909 Act was not subjected to Atascadero'sstringent standard that statutory language be unmistakably clear in providing a federal
cause of action applicable to states.
99. Copyright Act of 1909, Pub. L. No. 60-349, ch. 320, 35 Stat. 1075 (1909). Mills
was decided prior to the effective date of the 1976 Act.
100. Mills, 591 F.2d at 1284-85. The term "any person" is common in other federal
statutes. See id. at 1284 n.7.
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eleventh amendment was considered subordinate to the copyright
and patent clause, which empowered Congress "to regulate the commercial disposition of a certain property right."10 1 Further, the financial burden upon the state treasury, which might result from
such a suit, was viewed as minimal.o2 The Ninth Circuit concluded
that the eleventh amendment holds no weight against a cause of action created in a federal statute pursuant to the copyright and patent
clause.
Johnson v. University of Virginia10 3 was the first eleventh amendment and copyright infringement case decided under the 1976 Act.
Without a discussion of state consent, the Johnson court focused on
Mills' reading of Edelman 0 4-waiver of sovereign immunity must be
explicit or overwhelmingly apparent in the applicable statute.10 5 The
1976 Act replaced the 1909 Act's "any person" with the word "anyone."106 Johnson perceived this revision to be "at least as sweeping,
and probably more sweeping" 0 7 than the language "any person" in
the definition of the class of infringers.1 08 The court also held that
the eleventh amendment provides no state sovereign immunity in
this context because immunity was waived by Congress's enactment
of the 1976 Act. l0 9
In Mihalek Corp. v. Michigan,11o the district court explicitly ruled
that states were not immune from copyright infringement suits. The
101. Id, at 1285.
102. Id The court's conclusion that states liable for copyright infringement shall
not suffer financial hardship is based upon the fact that states infrequently participate
in infringement of copyright. See id.
103. 606 F. Supp. 321 (W.D. Va. 1985) (allegation that University of Virginia and
two employees infringed plaintiff's copyright of two photographs).
104. Id. at 323; see Mills Music, Inc. v. Arizona, 591 F.2d 1278, 1283 (9th Cir. 1979).
105. Johnson, 606 F. Supp. at 323 (citing Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974)).
106. See supra notes 87-89 and accompanying text.
107. Johnson, 606 F. Supp. at 324.
108. Id.
109. Id at 322.
110. 595 F. Supp. 903 (E.D. Mich. 1984), qff'd, 814 F,2d 290 (6th Cir. 1987). Plaintiff,
requesting damages and injunctive relief, brought suit in federal district court against
the state and state officials alleging copyright infringement as a result of the misappropriation of his copyrighted designs. Id, at 904-05. The district court entered summary
judgment for the state on the copyright and trademark infringement action. Id at 906.
On appeal, the Sixth Circuit did not reach the eleventh amendment issue. Instead, the
court held:
The fact that [the copyright holder] envisioned a promotional campaign featuring the use of tee-shirts, hats, slogans, pictures, and promotional events,
and that the campaigns utilized by the State of Michigan incorporated these
generally universal ideas.., in a public relations program to spotlight affirmative things about the State of Michigan is not any indication of similarity

court determined that infringement "is deserving of no more protection" than was allowed for benefits to the aged, blind, and disabled in
Edelman-which was none."' The state and its agencies were, thus,
totally immune from suit. 1 2 Consequently, a split developed in the
federal circuit and district courts.
2.

Copyright Law Post-Atascadero/Welch

Decided two months after the Court's ruling in Atascadero, Woelffer v. Happy States of America113 reveals the first effects of Atascadero114 on the 1976 Act's interaction with judicial interpretation of
the eleventh amendment. The Woe ffer court reaffirmed the proposition that a state may waive its immunity and consent to suit in federal court.1 1 5 A federally-created cause of action, however, may
cause such a waiver only if Congress made its intent to include states
16
as defendants "unmistakably clear in the language of the statute."1
Although Johnson and Mills held that "any person" and the current
version of the 1976 Act arguably included states in the defendant
class, Atascadero demands specific unequivocal language.1l 7 The
Woelffer court, therefore, concluded that the inferences drawn from
the 1976 Act's use of "anyone" are insufficient to constitute waiver." 8
In addition, the court refused to extend Fitzpatrick119 beyond a situation where a statute is passed pursuant to section 5 of the four20
teenth amendment.
where the individual clothing items, slogans, pictures and events were substantially different.
Mihalek Corp., 814 F.2d at 294-95.
111. Mihalek Corp., 595 F. Supp. at 906; see also Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651
(1974) (eleventh amendment barred retroactive relief against state because it constituted an award of damages against the state in violation of federal law).
112. Mihalek Corp., 595 F. Supp. at 906 (citing Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v.
Halderman, 465 U.S. 89 (1984) (eleventh amendment not only prohibits suit against
state but also prohibits federal court from awarding injunctive relief against state officials for claims predicated on state law). Injunctive relief was awarded against the individual defendants enjoining future violations because the eleventh amendment offers
no protection to non-state codefendants in a suit involving a state. Id. (citing Ex Parte
Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908)).
113. 626 F. Supp. 499 (N.D. Ill. 1985). A state agency sought declaratory judgment
that the eleventh amendment barred defendant corporation's copyright claim because
of the state's use of a slogan in its tourism campaign. Plaintiffs included the Illinois
Department of Commerce and Community Affairs, its directors, and an independent
advertising agency who had submitted work to the Department. Id. at 501.
114. Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234 (1985); see supra notes 59-69
and accompanying text.
115. Woelffer, 626 F. Supp. at 504-05.
116. 1& at 504 (citing Atascadero, 473 U.S. at 242).
117. Atascadero, 473 U.S. at 243.
118. Woelffer, 626 F. Supp. at 504-05.
119. Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976); see supra notes 50-56 and accompanying text.
120. Woelffer, 626 F. Supp. at 505 n.9. The court stated: "The Supreme Court has
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In Richard Anderson Photography v. Radford University,12 1 the
federal district court, which one year earlier presided over Johnson,

ruled differently. The court now found both eleventh amendment
and state law immunity, dismissing all claims against the defendant
state university. 122 The Fourth Circuit affirmed, 123 stating that Congress' use of "anyone" is not, "in

itse

,

a sufficiently clear and une-

quivocal indication of congressional intent to subject non-consenting
states to suits."124 After a detailed review,125 the court still concluded that the total language of the 1976 Act does not clearly and
2
unequivocally abrogate the eleventh amendment.1 6

The Fourth Circuit also addressed whether state use of copyrighted

material constitutes participation in a federally-regulated activity and
whether such participation constitutes constructive consent.12 7

The

court concluded that abrogation of eleventh amendment immunity by
participation in a federally-regulated activity exists where "a congressional expression of intent to condition participation upon consent [is]

as clear and unequivocal as that required to abrogate directly the im8

munity of non-consenting states."12

3.

Recent Effects of Atascadero and Welch Upon Copyright Law

The Ninth Circuit overruled its 1979 Mills129 decision in BV Engineering v.

University of California.130 Consequently, no federal

courts currently hold in favor of the 1976 Act's abrogation of the
held that 'Congress may, in determining what is 'appropriate legislation' for the purpose of enforcing the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment, provide for private
suits against States or state officials which are constitutionally impermissible in other
contexts.'" Id. (quoting Fitzpatrick, 427 U.S. at 456).
121. 633 F. Supp. 1154 (W.D. Va. 1986), aff'd sub nom, Richard Anderson Photography v. Brown, 852 F.2d 114 (4th Cir. 1988). The plaintiff in Richard Anderson Photography sought money damages against a state university for copyright infringement
of photographs taken for use in the school's yearbook. Id. at 1155-56.
122. Id. at 1159.
123. Richard Anderson Photography v. Brown, 852 F.2d 114 (4th Cir. 1988).
124. Id. at 118 (emphasis in original) (citing Welch, 107 S. Ct. 2941, 2949 (1987);
Atascadero, 433 U.S 234, 246 (1985)).
125. Richard Anderson Photography,852 F.2d at 118-19.
126. Id. at 120.
127. Id. at 120-22.
128. Id. at 121 (citing Atascadero, 473 U.S. at 247).
129. See BV Eng'g v. University of California, 858 F.2d 1394, 1398 n.1 (9th Cir.
1988), cert. denied, 57 U.S.L.W. 3621 (1989).
130. 858 F.2d 1394 (9th Cir. 1988), cert denied, 57 U.S.L.W. 3621 (1989). The University of California bought one copy of seven different copyrighted software programs
with their accompanying manuals from BV Engineering and made three copies of each
program and ten copies of the manual. Id. at 1395.

eleventh amendment.' 3 ' The Ninth Circuit outlined two ways in
which sovereign immunity may be abrogated, thus allowing a dam132
ages action.
First, a state may waive its immunity and consent to suit in federal
court.1 3 3 Waiver, however, exists only "where (1) the state expressly

consents; (2) a state statute or constitution so provides; or (3) Congress clearly intended to condition the state's participation in a program or activity on the state's waiver of immunity." 3 4 Applying this
waiver analysis, the Ninth Circuit concluded that California's use of
copyrighted materials and its obligation to pay royalties for such use
do not constitute express consent to federal suit.' 35 The court also
found an absence of statutory or constitutional waiver: "[F]or a state
statute or constitutional provision to constitute a waiver of eleventh
amendment immunity, it must specify the State's intention to subject
itself to suit in federal court."136 The court plainly stated there was

no indication in the 1976 Act that Congress intended to condition
state use of copyrighted material upon waiver of eleventh amend37
ment immunity.'
Second, the eleventh amendment does not bar an action for damages against a state's infringement when Congress creates, pursuant
to certain constitutional powers, a damages action against an nonconsenting state. However, such power is found in section 5 of the
fourteenth amendment and not in the copyright and patent clause.1ss
The Ninth Circuit clearly recognized that the Supreme Court reserved comment on Congress's ability to abrogate the eleventh
amendment pursuant to any other constitutional grant of power,
such as those enumerated in article 1.19 The copyright and patent
131. In 1962, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals was the first to address this controversy. The court, in Wihtol v. Crow, 309 F.2d 777 (8th Cir. 1962), held states to be
immune from suit for copyright infringement. In 1976, the Ninth Circuit's decision in

Mills Music, Inc. v. Arizona, 591 F.2d 1278 (9th Cir. 1979), held that states were not
immune from such suit, thus creating a circuit court split. See supra notes 91-101 and
accompanying text.

132. BVEng'g, 858 F.2d at 1395-96.
133. Id (citing Welch v. Texas Dept. of Highways & Pub. Transp., 107 S. Ct. 2941,
2945 (1987)).
134. BV Eng'g, 858 F.2d at 1396 (quoting Collins v. Alaska, 823 F.2d 329, 331-32 (9th
Cir. 1987) (emphasis added)).
135. BVEng'g, 858 F.2d at 1396.
136. Id. (quoting Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 241 (1985) (emphasis in original)).
137. BV Eng'g, 858 F.2d at 1396.
138. Id.; see, e.g., Welch v. Texas Dept. of Highways & Pub. Transp., 107 S. Ct. 2944,
2946 (1987); Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976); Collins v. Alaska, 823 F.2d 329,
332 (9th Cir. 1987); see also supra notes 50-56 and accompanying text.
139. BV Eng'g, 858 F.2d at 1396 (citing Welch, 107 S. Ct. 2941, 2946 (1987) ("assum[ing] without deciding or intimating a view of the question, that the authority of
Congress to subject unconsenting States to suit in federal court is not confined to section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment"); County of Oneida, New York v. Oneida Indian

Copyright Infringement

[Vol. 16: 663, 1989]

PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW

clause is one such enumerated power.140 The court, however, did not
discount the possibility that Congress has the authority to subject
non-consenting states to suit in federal court for infringement. Instead, it drew specific attention to circuit courts which have found
such power under article 1.141
The court pointed to the Supreme Court's recent grant of certiorari
in United States v. Union Gas Co.142 to decide this issue regarding the
commerce clause. Although the Ninth Circuit reserved deciding the

article I issue in BV Engineering,it hypothetically "assume[d], without deciding, that Congress may abrogate the states' eleventh amend43
ment immunity when acting under an Article I power."1
Relying on Atascadero's stringent test,

44

the court inferred that

the 1976 Act's definition of an infringer as "anyone" implied "a general authorization."1 4 5 Despite specific references in the 1976 Act to

state exemptions from liability,146 states remain immune from suit in
federal court for infringement. Congress failed to abrogate the eleventh amendment in the 1976 Act. 147 The court recognized, in a footnote, that Atascadero mandated the overruling of Mills, 148 and thus
concluded the 1976 Act does not abrogate the eleventh amendment.
IV.

ANALYSIS

The question remains, however, whether states should escape liability for copyright infringement. Although the Ninth Circuit, in BV

Engineering, decided in favor of immunity, it found plaintiff's arguNation, 470 U.S. 226, 252 (1985) (assuming without deciding, that Congress may abrogate eleventh amendment immunity when it acts pursuant to the commerce clause));
see U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
140. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
141. BV Eng'g, 858 F.2d at 1397 (citing United States v. Union Gas Co., 832 F.2d
1343, 1350-56 (3d Cir. 1987), cert. granted sub nom., Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 108
S. Ct. 1219 (1988) (pursuant to commerce clause, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3); In re
McVey Trucking, Inc., 812 F.2d 311, 314-23 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 227 (1987)
(pursuant to bankruptcy clause, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4); Peel v. Florida Dept. of
Transp., 600 F.2d 1070, 1080-81 (5th Cir. 1979) (pursuant to war power clause, U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11)).
142. 832 F.2d 1343 (3d Cir. 1987), cert. grantedsub nom., Pennsylvania v. Union Gas
Co., 108 S. Ct. 1219 (1988).
143. BV Eng'g, 858 F.2d at 1397.
144. Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234 (1985); see supra notes 62-69
and accompanying text.
145. BVEng'g, 858 F.2d at 1397-98.
146. Id. at 1398-99; see irkfra notes 173-74 and accompanying text.
147. BV Eng'g, 858 F.2d at 1400.
148. BV Eng'g, 858 F.2d at 1398 n.1; see Mills Music, Inc. v. Arizona, 591 F.2d 1278
(9th Cir. 1979); supra notes 93-102 and accompanying text.

ments for abrogation "compelling."'149 Furthermore, the court recognized its holding allows state violation of copyright law with
"impunity.' ' 150 Despite insistence that Atascadero prohibits subordination of the eleventh amendment by the 1976 Act,151 the reasoning
in BV Engineering is distorted. Four pertinent issues indicate that
the federally-created cause of action in the 1976 Act enables a copyright proprietor to sue an infringing state.
A.

CongressionalPower to.Abrogate Common Law Sovereign
Immunity

The copyright and patent clause gives Congress constitutional
power to uniformly regulate copyright and patent use nationally.
Through ratification of the Constitution, the states surrendered their
sovereignty as to the regulation of copyrights and patents. 152 The
Supreme Court confirmed this idea in Goldstein v. California:53
"When Congress grants an exclusive right or monopoly, its effects
are pervasive; no citizens or States may escape its reach."154 Thus,
the federally-created action within the 1976 Act falls under Congress's power to regulate copyright use and protection; such authorization of power abrogates common law sovereign immunity.
The eleventh amendment, however, limits such congressional
power.155 An examination of congressional intent behind the 1976
Act will reveal whether it implies state consent to be sued.
B.

CongressionalIntent Behind the CopyrightAct

Prior to Atascadero, courts had inconsistently construed the use of
language such as "any person," "every," "politic and governmental
149. BV Eng'g, 858 F.2d at 1400 (emphasis added); see supra notes 139-43 and accompanying text.
150. BVEng'g, 858 F.2d at 1400. "We recognize that our holding will allow states to
violate the federal copyright laws with virtual impunity." Id. It has been recognized
that by denying certiorari, the Supreme Court has "expos(ed] a loophole in federal
copyright law... [which could not only] mean a loss of millions of dollars in fees for
companies whose copyrighted products are used illegally by governmental agencies ...
[but could also be] financially devastating to authors of copyrighted works ...
threaten[ing] the future of emerging intellectual property industries." Savage, High
Court Allows Immunity for State in Copyright Suits, L.A. Times, Mar. 21, 1989, at 13,
col. 1.
151. Id,
152. Parden v. Terminal Ry. Co., 377 U.S. 184, 191-92 (1964) ("By empowering Congress to regulate commerce.., the States necessarily surrendered any portion of their
sovereignty that would stand in the way of such regulation.").
153. 412 U.S. 546 (1973).
154. Id. at 560 (concerning federal preemption of state copyright protection).
155. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 196 (1824) (The power vested in Congress through article I of the Constitution recognizes no limitation "other than [those]
prescribed in the Constitution.").
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bodies," and "anyone" to include states.156 Parden held that the language "every common carrier" in FELA157 was a broad description of
its defendant class; absent language to the contrary, congressional in-

tent to include states should be presumed.158 Employees effectively

reversed the Parden presumption, concluding that Congress would
have specifically included states if it so intended; therefore, such intent must be evident in the statutory language. 15 9 Mills and Johnson

rejected

the

Court's

reasoning

in Employees, and

embraced

Parden.160

In Mills, the Ninth Circuit noted cases which considered
"any person," as used in the 1909 Act, to include states.' 6 ' Atascadero

presumably clarified the confusion by affirming the rationale of Employees. The Supreme Court announced the requirement of an express statutory inclusion of states as possible defendants.162 With
this, the eleventh amendment dominated the statute and protected
states from suit.
An overview of court rulings indicates the eleventh amendment

bars suit in federal court-if the applicable legislation was enacted
under a broad constitutional grant of power. The copyright and patent clause, however, is not broad; rather, its purpose is explicit and

narrow. 163 The clause recognizes the importance of encouragement

and protection of copyright and patent by specifically authorizing
Congress to enact legislation to accomplish its goal.164
To suggest that states are not included in this national scheme of

copyright and patent protection denies the explicit constitutional
power of the clause to establish such protection. Furthermore, it de156. See, e.g., Parden v. Terminal Ry. Co., 377 U.S. 184 (1964).
157. Id. at 187; see supra notes 26-35 and accompanying text.
158. Parden,377 U.S. at 189-90.
159. Employees of Dept. of Pub. Health & Welfare v. Department of Pub. Health &
Welfare, 411 U.S. 279 (1973); see supra notes 36-41 and accompanying text.
160. Mills Music, Inc. v. Arizona, 591 F.2d 1278 (9th Cir. 1976); Johnson v. University of Virginia, 606 F. Supp. 321 (W.D. Va. 1985).
161. Mills, 591 F.2d at 1284 n.7 (citing Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678 (1978) ("any
person" was intended by Congress to include states); Forman v. Community Serv., Inc.,
500 F.2d 1246 (2d Cir. 1974), rev'd on other grounds, United Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837 (1975) ("any person" used in the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 to
include states)).
162. Atascadero, 473 U.S. 234, 241-42 (1985); see supra notes 59-64 and accompanying
text.
163. See supra notes 78-90 and accompanying text.
164. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 18. This clause, commonly referred to as the "necessary and proper clause" provides: "Congress shall have Power... To make all Laws
which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers." Id.

stroys the value of a national copyright system.' 6 5 The clause is explicit in its purpose and grant of power; the 1976 Act embodies
Congress's effort to effect that article I power.
Pursuant to section 301 of the 1976 Act, state courts are preempted
from enforcing copyright; actions may only be brought in federal
court. Consequently, Congress implemented section 1338(a) of Title
28 of the United States Code: "The district courts shall have original
jurisdiction of any civil action arising under any Act of Congress relating to... copyrights ....Such jurisdiction shall be exclusive of the
courts of the States in ...copyright cases."' 166
Courts have consistently ruled in favor of sovereign immunity in
situations where there exists a state forum to bring the cause of action. 6 7 Atascadero is no exception. 6 8 The Supreme Court, however,
has not allowed an eleventh amendment jurisdictional bar when federal court is the only forum in which to sue--as is the case with copyright infringement. Consequently, Atascadero is distinguishable from
BV Engineering and should not be relied upon. The Rehabilitation
Act, as discussed in Atascadero, allows an action to be brought in
state court.169 Suits for copyright infringement, however, do not
have the luxury of concurrent jurisdiction. It seems improbable that
Congress would grant a copyright proprietor a federal cause of action
and then prevent its exercise by denying him suit against an,infringing state; such a result leaves the copyright proprietor with no remedy whatsoever.
Atascadero mandates the unequivocal inclusion of states as defendants in copyright infringement suits only if specifically provided
within the statutory language. Without such inclusion, a suit may not
be brought against an infringing state.170 Arguably, the 1976 Act
meets the Atascadero standard. There is no explicit definition of the
term "anyone" in the 1976 Act's legislative history. 171 However, revision of the 1909 Act's "any person" language to "anyone" in the 1976
Act reveals a direct congressional intent that the reaches of copyright
protection be all encompassing, therefore including states. 172 This revision should not be viewed as limiting the class of defendants.
Additionally, Atascadero does not require that the analysis of the
165. BV Eng'g., 858 F.2d at 1400.
166. 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (1982).
167. See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
168. Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234 (1985).
169. See supra notes 60-61 and accompanying text.
170. See supra notes 59-69 and accompanying text.
171. See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
172. See Johnson v. University of Virginia, 606 F. Supp. 321, 324 (W.D. Va. 1985); see
supra notes 103-09 and accompanying text; see also Comment, Copyright Infringement
and the Eleventh Amendment: A Doctrine of Unfair Use?, 40 VAND. L. REV. 225, 24749 (1987).
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statutory language be limited to a single section. An analysis of the
entire statute is permissible in attempting to define the parameters of
the defendant class.173 Governmental bodies, including states, are exempt from liability for infringement under various sections in the

1976 Act. This may imply that, unless explicitly exempted, a state is
included in the class of possible copyright infringers. States are excluded from suit only when a provision of explicit exemption for certain activities exists. 1 7 4 If Congress had written the 1976 Act to

define infringer as "anyone, including states," the additional language

would be redundant. Arguably then, states should be immune only
when the Act specifies they may benefit from sovereign immunity
protection.
Ironically, even the United States itself can be sued for copyright
infringement, unless exempted under the 1976 Act itself. 1 7 5 Thus,
the Ninth Circuit in Mills correctly pointed out that "to hold Con-

gress did not intend to include states within the class of defendants
76
would lead to an anomalous construction of the statute at best."1

Therefore, pursuant to the specific grant of power in the copyright
and patent clause, the 1976 Act creates a cause of action for copyright

infringement which may be brought in a federal forum only. Additionally, the language of the statute provides specific sections which
explicitly exclude states from liability. Finally, the United States itself may be sued for infringement. Taken together, these facets of
the 1976 Act evidence a congressional intent to include states within

the defendant class of infringers.
173. Atascadero requires that Congress make its intention to abrogate the eleventh
amendment "unmistakably clear" in the statutory language. 473 U.S. at 241-42. The
Court's analysis of congressional intent extends to the entire statute and not merely
one section. Id.
174. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 110(2) (exemptions for certain governmental performances of
non-dramatic literary or musical copyrighted work, or. for display of copyrighted
work), 110(6) (exemptions for performance of non-dramatic musical work by a governmental body), 112(b) (exemption for ephemeral recording of governmental performance or display of work under section 110(2)), 601(b)(3) (exemption for governmental
use of non-dramatic literary material), 602(a)(1) (exemption for governmental use of
copies or phonorecords) (1982).
175. See 28 U.S.C. § 1498(b) (1982) This section states, in pertinent part:
Whenever the copyright in any work protected under the copyright laws of
the United States shall be infringed by the United States . . . the exclusive
remedy of the owner of such copyright shall be by action against the United
States in the Claims Court for the recovery of his reasonable and entire compensation as damages for such infringement.
I&
176. Mills Music, Inc. v. Arizona, 591 F.2d 1278, 1285 (9th Cir. 1979) (emphasis
added).

C. State Use of Copyrights as an Implied Waiver of Sovereign
Immunity
77
Under Richard Anderson Photography v. Radford University,1
state use of copyrighted material does not constitute an "unequivocal
indication" that a state has consented to suit. 178 Use of copyrighted
material is essential to the basic functioning of a state. A state,
therefore, has no choice whether to use such material.179 Absent this
choice, states make no decision to consent to suit; consequently, no
implied waiver exists.
In Atascadero, the Court stated: "A State may effectuate a waiver
of its constitutional immunity by a state statute or constitutional provision, or by otherwise waiving its immunity to suit in the context of
a particular federal program."l 8 0 Although Mills and Johnson held
that a state impliedly waives its immunity from infringement actions
in exchange for the benefit of using copyrighted material,' 8 ' use is
not considered participation in a federal program. No choice of participation is involved. Therefore, a state does not impliedly waive immunity, nor does it consent to suit by merely using copyrighted
material.

D.

UnilateralCongressionalAbrogation of Eleventh Amendment
Sovereign Immunity

Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer 8 2 found the eleventh amendment subordinate
to any statute passed pursuant to section 5 of the fourteenth amendment. 8 3 Consequently, the eleventh amendment does not operate in
an absolute manner; it does not preclude Congress from acting under
its plenary powers in subjecting non-consenting states to federal
court jurisdiction pursuant to a federally-created cause of action.
Section 5's exception to sovereign immunity creates an open door,
suggesting that since the eleventh amendment is not absolute, other
sections of the Constitution may provide congressional power sufficient to allow unilateral abrogation of sovereign immunity. 8 4 The
177. Richard Anderson Photography v. Radford Univ., 633 F. Supp. 1154 (W.D. Va.
1986), qff'd sub nom., Richard Anderson Photography v. Brown, 852 F.2d 114 (4th Cir.
1988).
178. Id. at 1159 (citing Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 238 n.1
(1985)).
179. See Employees of Dept. of Pub. Health & Welfare v. Department of Pub.
Health & Welfare, 411 U.S. 279, 296 (1973) (A state with no choice to act, does "not
voluntarily consent to the exercise of federal jurisdiction."); see also RichardAnderson
Photography,633 F. Supp. at 1157 n.6 ("state's consent must not be illusory").
180. Atascadero, 473 U.S. at 238 n.1.
181. Mills Music, Inc. v. Arizona, 591 F.2d 1278, 1283 (9th Cir. 1979); Johnson v.
University of Virginia, 606 F. Supp. 321, 324 (W.D. Va. 1985).
182. 427 U.S. 445 (1976); see supra notes 50-56 and accompanying text.
183. 427 U.S. at 456.
184. See infra note 186 and accompanying text.
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Supreme Court has never addressed this issue. The Court has either
chosen to "assume without deciding" that congressional power to abrogate is not confined to section 5, or has reserved judgment
entirely.S5
Several circuit courts, however, have addressed this issue, finding
that Congress "does have the power to abrogate eleventh amendment
immunity when it acts pursuant to Article I."' 186 Article I provides a
list of enumerated powers which the framers of the Constitution envisioned as requiring federal attention, protection, and enforcement.
Section 8, clause 18 of article I allows Congress to enact "the necessary and proper" legislation to ensure enforcement of these powers. 187 Consequently, the eleventh amendment's intervention with
laws enacted pursuant to article I prevents Congress from fully
utilizing its power. Many agree that:
Article I envisions that the national government will have exclusive power to
regulate certain subjects when, in the clearly expressed opinion of Congress,
such regulation would serve the nation's interests. To the extent that sovereigu immunity would free a state from such1 8national
controls, that immunity
8
is inconsistent with the constitutional plan.

The enactment of the eleventh amendment reveals constitutional intent to permit Congress only limited authority to abrogate sovereign
immunity and to eliminate judicial power to abrogate such immunity
entirely.
It seems reasonable that national plenary powers, such as those
under article I, would override a state's claim of sovereign immunity.
Consequently, extending the eleventh amendment to prohibit congressional abrogation of sovereign immunity, save legislation passed
under section 5 of the fourteenth amendment, would result in limiting congressional power beyond reason. States are provided, therefore, with an avenue to violate laws enacted pursuant to article I
powers and to improperly remain shielded from liability.
185. See supra notes 139-43 and accompanying text.
186. BV Eng'g v. University of California, 858 F.2d 1394, 1397 (9th Cir. 1988), cert.
denied, 57 U.S.L.W. 3621 (1989); see, e.g., United States v. Union Gas Co., 832 F.2d 1343
(3d Cir. 1987), cert. granted sub nom., Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 108 S. Ct. 1219
(1988) (whether Congress has power to unilaterally abrogate eleventh amendment
under commerce clause of article I); see also 42 U.S.C. § 9607 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986);
supra note 142 and accompanying text.
187. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
188. Tribe, IntergovernmentalImmunities in Litigation, Taxation, and Regulation:
Separationof Powers Issues in ControversiesAbout Federalism,89 HARV. L. REV. 682,
694-95 (1976).

V.

SOLUTIONS TO STATE SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY FROM SUIT IN
FEDERAL COURT FOR COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT

With the courts' unwillingness to find that the 1976 Act in fact
meets Atascadero's stringent test,189 other solutions must be sought
to override the judicial rulings which foreclose the recovery of damages for copyright infringement, as prescribed by statute, against nonconsenting state. Otherwise, the destruction of a national system of
copyright protection, a constitutionally-guaranteed monopoly established by Congress, will result. As the Supreme Court emphasizes in
Parden,such a result is "pointless and frustrating."190
Legislative and judicial solutions are available, which would provide copyright proprietors the expected protection against state infringers.' 91 The rewriting of the 1976 Act is one such solution. A
revision could make congressional intent to abrogate eleventh
amendment immunity unequivocally clear.192 There would no longer
be any doubt that a state's infringement of copyright would render it
susceptible to possible legal and/or equitable action. The drawback
to this solution is the implication that Congress has the power to abrogate a non-consenting state's eleventh amendment immunity.
However, it is this very result which the Supreme Court has proclaimed in Atascadero.193 If a statute meets the Atascadero standard,
sovereign immunity falls subordinate to the statute. Congress has
been given the authority to subject an non-consenting state to suit,
thus abrogating the eleventh amendment. If the 1976 Act were revised, states could no longer escape liability for copyright
infringement.
A second legislative solution is to amend section 1338(a) of Title 28
of the United States Code. 1 94 Common law sovereign immunity has
been nullified by the 1909 Act and the 1976 Act. However, the eleventh amendment precludes complete vindication of rights by a copyright owner since infringement suits may be brought only in federal
courts.195 An amendment to section 1338(a) could create concurrent
jurisdiction for copyright actions. A copyright proprietor could then
sue in state court and avoid the reaches of the eleventh amendment.
Finally, considerable weight must be given to the proposal that
189. See supra notes 113-48 and accompanying text.
190. Parden v. Terminal Ry. Co., 377 U.S. 184, 190 (1964).
191. See Comment, Copyright Infringement and the Eleventh Amendment: A Doctrine of Unfair Use? 40 VAND. L. REV. 225, 266-69 (1987).
192. Id. at 267-68.
193. Atascadero indicates that, when a statute clearly and unequivocally includes
states in a defendant class, the statute then abrogates a non-consenting state's sover-

eign immunity. 473 U.S. at 241-42.
194. 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (1982); see Comment, supra note 191, at 269.
195. See 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (1982).
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Congress can unilaterally abrogate the eleventh amendment pursuant to its article I powers. 196 It is useless to have given Congress
power to enact legislation to protect certain federally-recognized
rights, and then, as with the 1976 Act, provide only one forum in
which to vindicate violations of those rights. States are thus free to
act illegally, simply because they are states. The extent of Congress's
power to impose its will on states can be no greater under one plenary power, such as section 5 of the fourteenth amendment, than
under another, such as article I powers. 197 Ultimately, any act that is
plenary is a limitation upon state authority.198
VI.

CONCLUSION

Federal district and circuit courts have agreed that the eleventh
amendment dominates the 1976 Act. Should this status quo be maintained, states will continue to infringe copyrights-and states will inCopyright proprietors will remain
fringe more frequently.
completely unprotected from states' misappropriation of their works.
Furthermore, copyright proprietors will go uncompensated for their
works, in violation of the fifth amendment; 199 this lack of just compensation may slow actual production of works. This will certainly
impact the availability of copyrighted works to the states and the
general public.
Congress intended authors to have an exclusive monopoly so as to
provide authors an incentive to create works. 200 The expansion of
the eleventh amendment, as recently seen in the Ninth Circuit's reliance on Atascadero and Welch, has granted states complete sovereign
immunity and creates significant detrimental inroads into an author's
monopoly power. Such unlimited immunity offends creativity.
States must not be allowed the freedom to escape liability for copyright infringement.
MICHELLE

V.

FRANCIS

196. See supra notes 182-88 and accompanying text.
197. In re McVey Trucking, 812 F.2d 311, 321 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 227
(1987).
198. Id (quoting Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 456 (1976)).
199. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
200. See Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enter., 471 U.S. 539 (1985); Sears,
Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225 (1964); see also J. MADISON, THE FEDERALIST,
No. 43, at 309 (reprint 1961).

